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NOTE GIVEN To SUPPRESS

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION

Defendant's employee purchased an automobile from plaintiff with two checks drawn on a non-existent account. Subsequent to the bank's refusal to honor the checks, plaintiff notified the employee and threatened to have him arrested for issuing worthless checks. Defendant gave his promissory note in
the exact amount of the checks but later refused to pay, alleging
in defense that the note was given for illegal consideration' plaintiff's forbearance to prosecute defendant's employee for
issuing bad checks. The trial court rendered judgment for plaintiff and held that the note had been given for a valid consideration. This judgment was reversed by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeal which held that the note was unenforceable for lack
of legal consideration. On certiorari the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the note was given to pay the debt
of a third person and was therefore enforceable. Davis-Delcambre Motors v. Simon, 163 So. 2d 553 (La. 1964).
Under the Louisiana Civil Code all obligations must be supported by a lawful cause, for if the cause is forbidden by law,
contrary to moral conduct or contrary to public order, 2 the obligation can have no effect.3 An example of an obligation with an
unlawful cause is an agreement made for the purpose of suppressing criminal proceedings. But in determining the lawfulness of the cause in situations where both civil and criminal
liability existed, the courts have had to distinguish those cases
in which the cause was the suppression of the criminal prosecution from those in which the cause was a personal debt or the
debt of a third person. In all cases where the creditor expressly
promised to suppress or to dismiss criminal proceedings, the
courts have consistently held such obligations invalid. 4 In cases
where there was no express promise and the maker of the note
had an independent civil liability, the courts have held the notes
1. Although the term "consideration" is used, the court seems to be referring
to the civil law concept of cause, defined in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1896 (1870) as
the motive for making the contract, rather than to the common law concept of
consideration.
2. Id. art. 1895.
3. Id. art. 1893.
4. See Ozanne v. Haber, 30 La. Ann. 1384 (1878) (note given in exchange for
payee's promise to dismiss criminal proceedings against maker) ; Field v. Rogers;
26 La. Ann. 574 (1874) (note given in exchange for express promise to discontinue prosecution of maker for embezzlement).
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to be valid, considering the cause of the obligation to be payment
of the personal obligation.5 But where there was neither an express promise to forbear from initiating criminal prosecution
nor independent civil liability, the courts have required strong
proof to defeat the presumption in favor of legality, and notes
have been held valid when the facts failed to show either threats
of prosecution or an agreement to forbear." Likewise, when the
facts failed to establish threats to prosecute and even raised the
strong probability that there might not have been any crime, the
obligation has been upheld.7 In the cases in which agreements
have been struck down, the circumstances showed threats of
prosecution and strongly indicated an agreement to suppress
8
criminal proceedings.
The evidence in the instant case raised the close question
whether the note was given by defendant to suppress criminal
prosecution against defendant's employee, Mitchel. The plaintiff
admitted that if the defendant had not given him the note, he
would have had Mitchel arrested on criminal charges of issuing
worthless checks. Moreover, no action was taken against Mitchel
after the note was given. The defendant testified that he did
not know of the bad checks or that his employee might have to
go to jail. He also denied signing the note. The Court of Appeal
for the Third Circuit concluded that Mitchel was guilty of issuing worthless checks and that "the obvious consideration for the
note in question was the forbearance to prosecute Mitchel for
issuing a worthless check." 9 The Supreme Court found that
there was no proof of an intent to defraud, a necessary element
of the crime of issuing worthless checks, and that Mitchel, therefore, was not guilty of any crime. It also found that the plaintiff had not threatened the defendant and had not made a promise to suppress the prosecution of Mitchel. The Court concluded
5. See Morgan v. Knox, 15 La. Ann. 176 (1860) (note given by maker whose
slave was accused of arson) ; Butterly v. Blanchard, 1 Rob. 340 (La. 1842) (note
given by maker accused of assault and battery).
6. See Yowell & Williams v. Walker, 118 La. 28, 42 So. 635 (1906).
7. Schafter v. Irwin, 139 La. 92, 71 So. 241 (1916) (note given for third person possibly guilty of forgery).
8. See D'Agostino v. Vivirito, 130 So. 120 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930), where
the note was given to avoid prosecution of a son for theft. The evidence showed
that defendant did not intend his check to be cashed but rather to be used to
influence a third person to pay for stolen goods. See also Perry v. Frilot, 6 Mart.
(N.S.) 217 (La. 1827), where a note was given to a creditor who threatened to
prosecute the maker's son for fraud. The evidence raised a strong possibility that
the promisee was guilty of fraud.
9. 163 So. 2d at 557.
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that the consideration (cause) for the note was the debt of
Mitchel and that this consideration was sufficient to render the
note enforceable.
In reaching this decision the court indicated that it favors
the policy of enforcing obligations in the absence of strong proof
that the cause of the obligation was an agreement, or at least a
promise, to suppress criminal proceedings. Thus, even if the circumstances indicate that there was strong belief on the part of
the maker of the note that no criminal prosecution would follow,
the note will be enforceable because the court requires proof of
a promise or of an agreement to suppress prosecution. It could
be argued that the restrictive approach followed by the court of
appeal is preferable in order to eliminate any use of the threat
of criminal prosecution to enforce civil obligations. But it is
submitted that the approach of the Supreme Court is the better
policy for it is more in keeping with the civil law tradition of
allowing the individual the greatest freedom of contract, provided he does not violate law, good morals or public policy. The
requirement of a lawful cause is a restraint imposed upon this
freedom and as such should be narrowly construed. In cases of
doubt the presumption should be in favor of freedom of contract.
In addition, if the restrictive approach of the court of appeal is
followed, there would be an unnecessary restriction on the ability of an individual to satisfy a natural obligation by voluntary
transactions. In many of the cases dealing with attempts of the
maker to satisfy the obligations of close relatives or friends, the
circumstances indicate that one of the primary motives for executing the note might have been the feeling of a natural obligation to do so. 10
When the obligations are clearly contrary to law, good morals
or public policy, the courts possess the power to strike them
down; but in the absence of persuasive proof of such opposition,
the freedom of the contractual will should prevail.
Howard W. L'Enfant
10. See Schafter v. Irwin, 139 La. 92, 71
Williams v. Walker, 118 La. 28, 42 So. 635
26 La. Ann. 574 (1874) (brother); Perry
1827) (son) ; D'Agostino v. Vivirito, 130 So.

So. 241 (1916) (friend) ; Yowell &
(1907) (brother) ; Field v. Rogers,
v. Frilot, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 217 (La.
120 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930) (son).

